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The Accountant’s Certificate in Connection
with the Accountant's Responsibility*
By Sir William Plender

The subject upon which I have been asked to address you at
this conference is comprehensive in scope and character. The
duties undertaken by the professional accountant in Great Britain
today cover a wide field and are of varied nature, but it is true to
say that to a very considerable extent the result of the accountant’s
work is embodied, and finds its expression, in the form of a
report or certificate. Indeed, if any evidence were required of the
extent to which the investing public and business community
associate the accountant’s duties with his report or certificate, it
is to be found in the frequent use and acceptance of the phrase
“the accountant’s certificate,” as indicating the bona fides of
figures which the accountant has reported upon or certified, or
in respect of which his investigation and confirmation are desired.
A clear conception by accountants of their duties and re
sponsibilities in connection with certificates issued by them is
thus of vital importance. An exhaustive treatise dealing with
the matter in all its aspects would occupy much more time than
has been allotted to me and occupy more space in your transac
tions than can be spared; neither do I imagine you would wish me
to enter upon a detailed dissertation on the many and varied
circumstances leading up to the issue of certificates. I therefore
propose, in my remarks, to deal with the subject broadly and in
general outline, in such a manner as to indicate the fundamental
principles which every accountant should bear in mind, when
called upon in the exercise of his professional duties to prepare
and attach his signature to a certificate.
In Great Britain the profession of an accountant is not exer
cisable under any legal enactment, and the accountant has, there
fore, no legal status in the same way as a lawyer. So far as I
know, no country has accorded the profession legislative sanction
as such. The practice of the profession of an accountant by
members of recognized bodies with disciplinary powers has, how
ever, long been accepted and regarded in Great Britain by the
courts and the business community as one of high standing and
*A paper read before the International Accountants’ Congress, Amsterdam, 1926.
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responsibility. Neither do the duties or responsibilities of ac
countants as such form the subject of any act of parliament. It
has, however, become necessary from time to time for the courts
to consider the question of the duties and responsibilities of
accountants, and the judgments given in cases which have been
adjudicated upon are available as a source of information and
guidance. But whilst the accountant must have regard, for his
own protection, to the legal aspect of his duties and responsibilities,
no such limitation should be permitted to lessen the duty pre
scribed by a code of professional honor which he owes not only
to his client but to the public, to the profession and to his own
reputation. And perhaps in no other circumstances is a due
sense of this moral duty and responsibility required in such high
degree as when the accountant is engaged in framing a certificate.
Having thus briefly defined the sense in which I speak of the
accountant, it is necessary to consider the various forms of cer
tificates which accountants are called upon to give. Broadly,
these certificates may be said to fall under two heads, namely:
(a) Those given in accordance with statutory requirements; and
(b) Other certificates.
The former in the main comprise certificates or reports by
accountants as auditors of public and other companies. Amongst
the latter may be cited those given in connection with:
(1) Raising share and debenture capital by means of a pro
spectus or otherwise.
(2) Absorption or amalgamation of companies or firms.
(3) Trade agreements between groups of companies for sharing
profits or losses upon a specified basis.
(4) Determination of profits available for defined purposes,
such as sums payable to different classes of share or
debenture holders; management commission; profitsharing schemes, etc.
(5) Expenditure upon contracts.
(6) “Fair value” of shares under terms of articles of association
and valuation of shares for purpose of assessment to
death duties.
(7) Ascertainment of relative shares of capital and labor in
profits of an industry under joint agreement.
The instances I have noted by way of example, whilst including
some of the more important circumstances in which certificates are
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frequently given, are by no means exhaustive. Other illustrations
could be furnished, but it seems unnecessary for my present
purpose to add to the list.
Whilst the same standard of duty and conduct should be ob
served, and the highest degree of proficiency exercised in the
preparation of all certificates, the measure of the accountant’s
responsibility varies considerably and is dependent upon a com
bination of factors and circumstances. As exemplifying cases,
to which the heaviest responsibility attaches, I propose in this
paper to consider and deal with two classes of certificates well
known to the general public in Great Britain, namely, certificates
given by the accountant qua auditor in fulfilment of statutory
requirements under the companies (consolidation) act, 1908, and
certificates appearing in prospectuses inviting public subscription
to issues of share and debenture capital. And as both these
certificates have relation to the affairs of joint-stock companies,
it may not be inappropriate at this stage if I refer briefly to the
radical change which has taken place during the last 50 years in
the financial structure of industry.
This transformation is chiefly apparent in the aggregation
and transference of immense amounts of capital from the hands
of individuals to joint-stock undertakings administered under
boards of directors. The following figures extracted from the
last published return of the British board of trade, dealing with
the affairs of limited liability companies in Great Britain, show
the rapid development and expansion of joint-stock enterprise:
Number of limited Total paid-up share capital
liability companies
1885.......................
8,924
£482,000,000
1895..............................
18,607
£1,037,000,000
1905..............................
38,317
£1,912,000,000
1915..............................
63,969
£2,606,000,000
1924..............................
90,918
£4,356,000,000
Year

The figures quoted are exclusive of capital—running into
many hundreds of millions of pounds—embarked in what are
known as parliamentary or statutory companies incorporated
under special acts of parliament, mainly of a public-utility char
acter such as railways, canals, and gas and water undertakings.
No official statistics are available of the aggregate amount of
debenture capital raised and employed by joint-stock companies
or of the accumulations of undistributed profits retained as free
reserves or otherwise, but the combined amount thereof must be
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very considerable. And apart from permanent share capital,
free reserves and debenture capital—either irredeemable or of
fixed maturity—financial obligations to creditors are contracted
in the ordinary course of trade in respect of which vast sums are
owing at any given date. These facts sufficiently indicate the
importance of the financial interests of shareholders and creditors
and the responsibilities involved in the administration of jointstock enterprises. The part played by the accountant in the
capacity of auditor and expert financial advisor has materially
contributed to the growth and present standing of the profession
as carried on today in Great Britain, and the position the ac
countant has thus attained in the public confidence, whilst en
hancing his authority, has also widened his responsibilities.
Compulsory audit of the accounts of limited companies—other
than banks—was not imposed by the legislature until the year
1900, but the appointment of auditors under a company’s own
regulations (articles of association) was customary and regarded
as an essential safeguard by the majority of reputable public
companies before that date. The statutory obligation requiring
the appointment of auditors in the case of all registered companies
was first contained in the companies act, 1900, and the duties of
the auditor were therein laid down in the following terms:
Every auditor of a company shall have a right of access at all times to
the books and accounts, and vouchers of the company, and shall be entitled
to require from the directors and officers of the company such information
and explanation as may be necessary for the performance of the duties of
the auditors; and the auditors shall sign a certificate at the foot of the
balance-sheet, stating whether or not all their requirements as auditors
have been complied with, and shall make a report to the shareholders on
the accounts examined by them, and on every balance-sheet laid before the
company in general meeting during their tenure of office, and in every such
report shall state whether in their opinion the balance-sheet referred to in
the report is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of
the state of the company’s affairs as shown by the books of the company,
and such report shall be read before the company in general meeting.

In practice the certificate and report of the auditor became
merged and, subject to reservations and enlargements as circum
stances required or justified, usually appeared as one document
at the foot of the balance-sheet in the following general terms:
“ In accordance with the provisions of the companies act, 1900, I certify
that all my requirements as auditor have been complied with, and I report
to the shareholders that I have audited the books of the company, and in
my opinion the balance-sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs as shown by the
books of the company.”
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The distinction between the auditor’s “certificate” and
“report” thus became more apparent than real; and although in
the section of the companies (consolidation) act, 1908, which now
governs the duties of auditors the word “certificate” has entirely
disappeared and the auditor’s report alone is mentioned, the
habit previously acquired of referring to the auditor’s certificate
still largely obtains.
The statutory rights and duties of auditors of limited com
panies are now embodied in the companies (consolidation) act,
1908—an act, as its title implies, consolidating and codifying
previous legislation—as under:
113. (1) Every auditor of a company shall have a right of access at all
times to the books and accounts and vouchers of the company, and shall be
entitled to require from the directors and officers of the company such in
formation and explanation as may be necessary for the performance of the
duties of the auditors.
(2) The auditors shall make a report to the shareholders on the accounts
examined by them, and on every balance-sheet laid before the company
in general meeting during their tenure of office, and the report shall state—
(a) whether or not they have obtained all the information and explana
tions they have required; and
(b) whether, in their opinion, the balance-sheet referred to in the report is
properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the
state of the company’s affairs according to the best of their infor
mation and the explanations given to them, and as shown by the
books of the company.
(3) . . . the auditor’s report shall be attached to the balance-sheet, or
there shall be inserted at the foot of the balance-sheet a reference to the
report, and the report shall be read before the company in general meeting,
and shall be open to inspection by any shareholder.

It is the exception, rather than the rule, for the auditor’s
report to constitute a separate document apart from that ap
pended to the balance-sheet, and the form in which the report
is most frequently framed follows closely the wording of the act.
When the auditor is satisfied as a result of his examination that
there are no exceptional or special circumstances to which the
attention of the shareholders need be directed, he gives an un
qualified report usually in the following terms:
“I have audited the above balance-sheet and have obtained all the in
formation and explanations I have required. In my opinion such balancesheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and correct view of the
state of the company’s affairs according to the best of my information and
the explanations given to me and as shown by the books of the company.”

No attempt has been made in the act—nor, indeed, would it
be possible in the varying circumstances and conditions under
which business is carried on—to define even in general terms
the extent or limits of the auditor’s duty. The legislature has
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placed at the disposal of the auditor simple and adequate means
of inquiry to supplement the direct evidence afforded by the
books and accounts and has not restricted in any way the scope
of his report. It is thus left to the auditor himself, with his
professional training and experience, to determine both the
extent of his examination and the nature of his report by refer
ence to the necessities of each particular case. The general prin
ciples which, according to legal interpretation, the auditor should
bear in mind and follow, have been enumerated with great dis
tinctness by the British courts in three well known and familiar
cases in which auditors were accused of neglect in the perform
ance of their duties, and the judgments delivered may be sum
marized thus:
(a) An auditor is guilty of misfeasance (that is, breach of duty)
who, when dissatisfied with the accounts of a company, does not
plainly draw attention to the grounds for his dissatisfaction in
his report (the case of the London and General Bank, Ltd.).
(b) An auditor is not guilty of breach of duty who, in the
absence of suspicious circumstances, relies upon statements made
by trusted officers of a company (the case of the Kingston Cotton
Mills Co., Ltd.).
(c) An auditor is liable if falsification in the accounts of a com
pany might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
care and skill (the case of the Irish Woollen Co., Ltd. v. Tyson
and others.)
Widely as individual circumstances may differ in practice, the
measure of the auditor’s legal responsibility in connection with
his certificate may be said to rest upon the practical interpreta
tion of these three decisions. I therefore propose to examine the
principles applied by the court in determining whether an auditor
has properly fulfilled his statutory duties.
The development of the office of auditor is a natural corollary
to the expansion of joint-stock enterprise, and although he is
appointed by and reports to the shareholders as a body, the
nature and object of the office involve in special degree a duty
to the shareholders concerned solely as investors as distinct from
shareholders engaged in the management and direction, i. e.,
directors. This distinction has been recognized judicially in the
following words:
“ Possibly he” (the auditor) “did not realize the extent of his duty to the
shareholders, as distinguished from the directors, and he unfortunately
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consented to leave the chairman to explain the true state of the company
to the shareholders instead of doing so himself. ... It is impossible to
read . . . the companies act . . . without being struck with the impor
tance of the enactment that the auditors are to be appointed by the share
holders, and are to report to them directly, and not to or through the
directors. The object of this enactment is obvious. It evidently is to
secure to the shareholders independent and reliable information respecting
the true financial position of the company at the time of the audit.” (Re
London and General Bank, Ltd.)

The object of the audit is thus defined in judicial language,
and the view expressed may be regarded as an adequate and
clear interpretation of the intention underlying the statutory re
quirements. These requirements involve two essential and
interdependent assumptions. First the exercise of independent
judgment as conveyed by the words “in my opinion,” and,
secondly, the possession of a high degree of professional skill
and ability in ascertaining the facts justifying the opinion ex
pressed that the balance-sheet is properly drawn up so as to
exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company’s
affairs according to the best of the information and explanations
given to the auditor and as shown by the books of the company.
As will be seen hereafter, the protection afforded to the auditor
by the use of the phrases “in my opinion” and “according to
the best of my information and the explanations given to me and
as shown by the books of the company,” is dependent upon his
own professional efficiency and the extent of his examination
and inquiries. Nor would it be in the best interests of the pro
fession to avoid responsibility—either legal or moral—by attach
ing a too literal meaning to the words I have quoted.
As exemplifying the scope and limits in law of the auditor’s
duties and responsibilities, the judges have laid down the follow
ing dicta, which for convenience I have arranged under four
headings:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The general nature of the auditor’s duties.
The scope of the auditor’s investigation and inquiries.
Limitations of the auditor’s responsibilities.
Considerations affecting the auditor’s report.

I am led to give in some detail the views of British judges
which bear on an auditor’s duties and responsibilities as my
audience here may not be so familiar with them as would be the
case with an audience exclusively British. But their value is to
no small extent international.
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(1) THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE AUDITOR’S DUTIES
“His business is to ascertain and state the true financial position of the
company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that. But
then comes the question, How is he to ascertain that position? The
answer is, By examining the books of the company. But he does not dis
charge his duty by doing this without inquiry and without taking any
trouble to see that the books of the company themselves show the com
pany’s true position. He must take reasonable care to ascertain that they
do. Unless he does this his audit would be worse than an idle farce. . . .
His first duty is to examine the books not merely for the purpose of ascer
taining what they do show but also for the purpose of satisfying himself
that they show the true financial position of the company.” (Re London
and General Bank, Ltd.)
“The words ‘as shown by the books of the company’ seem to me to be
introduced to relieve the auditors from any responsibility as to the affairs
of the company kept out of the books and concealed from them but not to
confine it to a mere statement of the correspondence of the balance-sheet
with the entries in the books.” (Re London and General Bank, Ltd.)
“Auditors of a limited company are bound to know or make themselves
acquainted with their duties under the articles of the company whose ac
counts they are appointed to audit and under the companies acts for the
time being in force.” (Re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Ltd.)
“That it is the duty of a company’s auditor in general to satisfy himself
that the securities of the company in fact exist and are in safe custody,
can not, I think, be gainsaid. . . . An auditor is not, in my judgment, ever
justified in omitting to make personal inspection of securities that are in
the custody of a person or company with whom it is not proper that they
should be left. . . . The duty of the auditor is to verify the facts which it
is proposed to state in the balance-sheet, and in doing so to use reasonable
and ordinary skill.” (Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.)
(2) THE SCOPE OF THE AUDITOR’S INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRIES
“An auditor, however, is not bound to do more than exercise reasonable
care and skill in making inquiries and investigations. . . . What is
reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the circumstances
of that case. Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very little in
quiry will be reasonably sufficient; and in practice I believe business men
select a few cases haphazard, see that they are right, and assume that
others like them are correct also. When suspicion is- aroused more care is
obviously necessary; but still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than
reasonable care and skill even in a case of suspicion.” (Re London and
General Bank, Ltd.)
“An auditor is not bound to be a detective or . . . to approach his
work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something
wrong. He is a watch-dog but not a bloodhound. He is justified in be
lieving tried servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the
company. He is entitled to assume that they are honest and to rely upon
their representations provided he takes reasonable care. If there is any
thing calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to the bottom, but in
the absence of anything of that kind he is only bound to be reasonably
cautious and careful. The duties of auditors must not be rendered too
onerous. Their work is responsible and laborious and the remuneration
moderate.” (Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., Ltd.)
“The duty of an auditor is verification and not detection ... it is for
the auditor to use his discretion and his judgment and his discrimination as
to whom he shall trust; indeed, that is the right way to put a greater re
sponsibility on the auditors. ... I throw a burden upon him in respect
of which the test of common sense and business habits can be applied
rather than impose on him a rigid rule which is not based on any principle
either of business or common sense. ... In my opinion it would not be
right that auditors should deliberately adopt a standard of verification
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below the ordinary standard because the persons with whom they are deal
ing are persons of specially high reputation.” (Re City Equitable Fire In
surance Co., Ltd.)
“The auditor can not shelter himself from any breach of duty under
the neglect of the directors; he is there to do his duty to the company.”
(London Oil Storage Co., Ltd. v. Seear, Hasluck & Co.)

(3) LIMITATIONS OF THE AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES
“ It is no part of an auditor’s duty to give advice either to directors or
shareholders as to what they ought to do. An auditor has nothing to do
with the prudence or imprudence of making loans with or without security.
It is nothing to him whether the business of a company is being conducted
prudently or imprudently, profitably or unprofitably; it is nothing to him
whether dividends are properly or improperly declared provided he dis
charges his own duty to the shareholders. . . . He is not an insurer; he
does not guarantee that the books do correctly show the true position of a
company’s affairs; he does not even guarantee that his balance-sheet is
accurate according to the books of the company. If he did he would be
responsible for an error on his part even if he were himself deceived, with
out any want of reasonable care on his part—say by the fraudulent con
cealment of a book from him. His obligation is not so onerous as this.
He is perfectly justified in acting on the opinion of an expert where special
knowledge is required.” (Re London and General Bank, Ltd.)
“ It is no part of an auditor’s duty to take stock. ... He must rely on
other people for details of the stock-in-trade on hand. Auditors must not
be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of
fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion and when those
frauds are perpetrated by tried servants of the company and are unde
tected for years by the directors. So to hold would make the position of
an auditor intolerable.” (Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co., Ltd.)
(4) CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE AUDITOR’S REPORT
“He must be honest—that is, he must not certify what he does not be
lieve to be true and he must take reasonable care and skill before he be
lieves that what he certifies is true. ... A person whose duty it is to
convey information to others does not discharge that duty by simply giving
them so much information as is calculated to induce them or some of them
to ask for more. Information and means of information are by no means
equivalent terms. An auditor who gives shareholders means of informa
tion instead of information respecting a company’s financial position does
so at his peril and runs the very serious risk of being held judicially to have
failed to discharge his duty. Still, there may be circumstances under
which information given in the shape of a printed document circulated
amongst a large body of shareholders, would by its consequent publicity
be very injurious to their interests and in such a case I am not prepared to
say that an auditor would fail to discharge his duty if instead of publishing
his report in such a way as to insure publicity he made a confidential report
to the shareholders and invited their attention to it and told them where
they could see it.” (Re London and General Bank, Ltd.)
“In reporting upon the accounts submitted to them the auditors do
not, of course, report as to the details of accounts to which they find no
cause to take exception. Their duty is to call attention to that which is
wrong, not to condescend upon all the details of that which is right. . . .
Those who are engaged in commerce are familiar with the fact that undue
publicity as regards the details of their trade or as to their financial arrange
ments may often be very injurious to traders having regard to the rivalry
of competitors in trade, to complications sometimes arising from strained
relations between capital and labor and the like. There are legitimate
reasons for ensuring secrecy to a proper extent. It is not, I think, neces
sary, nor having regard to the great utility of these acts, is it desirable to
expose persons who trade under these acts to the necessities of a publicity
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from which their competitors are free unless such publicity is required to
insure commercial integrity.” (Newton v. Birmingham Small Arms Co., Ltd.)
“When it is shown that audited balance-sheets do not show the true
financial condition of the company and that damage has resulted the onus
is on the auditors to show that this is not the result of any breach of duty on
their part.” (Re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Ltd.)

That the practical application of these principles is frequently
a task of great difficulty is self-evident from the language used,
and recognition of this fact has been expressed by the courts in
more than one case as the following extracts taken from the
remarks of the judges will show:
“ It is quite easy to lay down to you in general terms what the duty of
an auditor is; it is very much more difficult . . . to apply that duty to the
particular case.” (London Oil Storage Co., Ltd. v. Seear, Hasluck & Co.)
“They (the auditors) had to exhibit a standard of professional skill,
and if they did not come up to that standard that was for the judge or
jury ... to say and that was always a difficult matter to try.” (Arthur
E. Green & Co. v. The Central Advance & Discount Corporation, Ltd.)

A dishonest auditor renders himself liable to prosecution under
criminal law for wilfully making a statement knowing it to be
false in any material particular. Proceedings may be brought
against him:
(a) Under section 281 of the companies (consolidation) act,
1908, which reads:
If any person in any return, report, certificate, balance-sheet, or
other document required by or for the purposes of any of the provisions of
this act specified in the fifth schedule hereto, wilfully makes a statement
false in any material particular knowing it to be false, he shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to im
prisonment for a term not exceeding two years, with or without hard
labor, and on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceed
ing four months, with or without hard labor, and in either case to a fine
in lieu of or in addition to such imprisonment as aforesaid:
Provided that the fine imposed on summary conviction shall not
exceed one hundred pounds.

(b) Under section 84 of the larceny act, 1861, which enacts:
Whosoever, being a director, manager or public officer of any body
corporate or public company, shall make, circulate or publish, or concur
in making, circulating, or publishing, any written statement or account
which he shall know to be false in any material particular, with intent to
deceive or defraud any member, shareholder, or creditor of such body cor
porate or public company, or with intent to induce any person to become
a shareholder or partner therein, or to entrust or advance any property to
such body corporate or public company, or to enter into any security for
the benefit thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted
thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the court to any of the punish
ments which the court may award as hereinbefore last mentioned.

In this paper, however, I am concerned only with the penalties
to which the auditor is exposed in civil proceedings by reason of
errors of omission or commission amounting to breach of duty on
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his part. Such proceedings may be brought (1) under common
law on the ground of negligence for which every agent is liable
through lack of reasonable care or diligence, or (2) when a com
pany is being wound up by way of misfeasance summons, under
section 215 of the companies (consolidation) act, 1908, which
enacts:
(1) Where in the course of winding up a company it appears that any
person who has taken part in the formation or promotion of the company,
or any past or present director, manager or liquidator, or any officer of the
company has misapplied or retained or become liable or accountable for
any money or property of the company, or been guilty of any misfeasance
or breach of trust in relation to the company the court may, on the appli
cation of the official receiver, or of the liquidator, or of any creditor or
contributory, examine into the conduct of the promoter, director, manager,
liquidator, or officer and compel him to repay or restore the money or
property or any part thereof respectively with interest at such rate as the
court thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of the company
by way of compensation in respect of the misapplication retainer, mis
feasance or breach of trust as the court thinks just.
The section shall apply notwithstanding that the offense is one for
which the offender may be criminally responsible.

It is interesting to note the views of one of the lords of appeal
upon the terms of section 165 of the companies act of 1862, which
corresponds in almost precise words with the section of the act
of 1908 which I have just quoted. He says:
“That section creates no new offense, and it gives no new rights, but only
provides a summary and efficient remedy in respect of rights which apart
from that section might have been vindicated either at law or in equity.
It has also been settled that the misfeasance spoken of in that section is not
misfeasance in the abstract, but misfeasance in the nature of a breach of
trust resulting in a loss to the company.” (Bentinck v. Fenn.)

The measure of the auditor’s responsibility under the above
section is, therefore, the loss sustained by the company—direct
or consequential—due to failure on his part to point out a state
of affairs the disclosure of which would have either prevented the
initiation of a wrongful or mistaken course of action or conduct
or have resulted in its discovery and discontinuance.
(To be concluded)
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